Geographic commands can be organized by service (Department of the Navy, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force) or function (air, land,

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Updated January 12, 2024

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations

Military operations, both in peacetime and in war, are an inherently complex undertaking. One key to success, therefore, is a clear, unified chain of command. This enables senior leaders in the U.S. government—in particular, the President and the Secretary of Defense—to command and control military forces around the world.

A (Very) Brief History of the Chain of Command The way the United States commands and controls its forces is in large part a product of an inherent tension between improving the effectiveness of U.S. forces, on the one hand, and preserving civilian control of the military, on the other. The experience of World War II convinced President Truman, among others, that a greater degree of coordination and integration between the U.S. military services was necessary to improve the conduct of military operations. Yet there was concern at the time that integrating these institutions might result in an overly powerful military staff element that could threaten the principle of civilian control of U.S. forces.

The resulting compromise was to create a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), comprising all the military service chiefs, and headed by a Chairman serving as an advisory body only. As a corporate body, the JCS was specifically not designed to exercise command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) had no command authority. The JCS did, however, have responsibility for establishing “unified combatant commands,” which were charged with executing military operations in different parts of the world by combining the capabilities of two or more military services. Different service chiefs were assigned executive and administrative responsibilities for these combatant commands, which gave them a mechanism through which they could influence ongoing military operations. By 1953, the authority to establish Combatant Commands (COCOMs) was assigned to the Secretary of Defense, although the relative ambiguity of the chain of command remained a feature of Department of Defense (DOD) operations until 1986.

Perceived shortcomings in the U.S. chain of command led to demonstrable failures during several incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The military services, in the view of many observers, failed to effectively plan or conduct operations jointly due to confusion over whether the military services or unified combatant commanders were ultimately in charge of operations. These incidents included the 1983 operation in Grenada; the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt (officially “Operation Eagle Claw” but often called “Desert One”); and the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act (P.L. 99-433), which mandated clarifications to the chain of command.

The current command and control architecture for DOD is a product of these congressionally mandated changes.

The Chain of Command Title 10 U.S.C. §162 specifies that the chain of command for military operations goes from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to Commanders of Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as an intermediary, transmitting orders between the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of Combatant Commands. Each Combatant Commander is a four-star Flag or General Officer, whose appointment is confirmed by the Senate.

Unified Command Plan (UCP) The UCP is a classified executive branch document that articulates how DOD assigns responsibility for different missions and areas of the world. It is prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every two years and approved by the President. Each UCP sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Congress is not included in this review process but does have visibility into issues affecting UCP development. It is through the UCP that DOD develops its global map of areas of responsibilities for its Combatant Commanders, reflected in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Combatant Commanders’ Area of

Responsibility

Source: Association of the U.S. Army, “The Army on Point: A

Detailed Summary of Current Operations and Responsibilities

(2022),” August 5, 2022. Accessed November 28, 2022,

https://www.ausa.org/publications/army-point-detailed-summary-

current-operations-and-responsibilities-2022.

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations

https://crsreports.congress.gov

The Combatant Commands Today A COCOM is a military command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments. There are currently eleven Combatant Commands. The COCOMs have responsibility for the military’s operations in their respective areas.

There are seven regionally focused COCOMS, which operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus:

• U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), responsible for sub-Saharan Africa. It is located at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

• U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), responsible for all of Europe, large portions of Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. It is located at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

• U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), responsible for most of the Middle East, parts of Northern Africa and west Asia, and part of the Indian Ocean. It is located at MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

• U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), responsible for the defense of the continental United States and coordination of security and military relationships with Canada and Mexico. It is located at Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

• U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), responsible for Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. It is located in Miami, FL.

• U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), responsible for the Pacific Ocean, Southwest Asia, Australia, south Asia, and part of the Indian Ocean. It shares responsibility for Alaska with U.S. Northern Command. It is located at Camp H.M. Smith, HI.

• U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), provides space combat power for the Joint/Combined force and develops joint warfighters in, from, and through the space domain. It is located at Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

There are also four “functional” COCOMs, which operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services:

• U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), responsible for deterring attacks on the United States and its allies and directing the use of U.S. strategic forces. It is located at Offutt Air Force Base, NE.

• U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which provides special forces, counter-paramilitary, counter- narcotics, guerilla, psychological warfare, civil education, and insurgency capabilities. It is located at MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

• U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), which provides air, land and sea transportation to different components of DOD. It is located at Scott Air Force Base, IL.

• U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs, synchronizes, and coordinates cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners. It is located at Fort George G. Meade, MD.

Service Component Commands Service Component Commands consist of organizations, individuals, units, detachments, and/or support forces that belong to a particular military service but are assigned to a Combatant Commander. As an example, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT), U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), and U.S. Air Forces Central Command (USAFCENT) are all service component commands to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). These components are subordinate to their respective Combatant Commanders.

The Laws Governing COCOMs COCOMs are governed by the provisions contained in Sections 161 through 167b of Title10, Armed Forces, U.S. Code. These sections address the following provisions:

• Section 161: The establishment of COCOMs;

• Section 162: Chain of command and assignment of forces for COCOMs;

• Section 163: Role of the CJCS;

• Section 164: Assignment and powers and duties of commanders of COCOMs;

• Section 165: Administration and support of COCOMs;

• Section 166: COCOM budget proposals;

• Section 166a: Funding COCOMs through the CJCS;

• Section 166b: Funding for combating terrorism readiness initiatives;

• Section 167: Unified COCOMs for special operations forces; and

• Section 167b: Unified COCOM for cyber operations.

CRS Products

CRS Report R44474, Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform

and Issues for Congress, by Kathleen J. McInnis

Kathleen J. McInnis was the original author of this product.

Nathan J. Lucas, Coordinator, Section Research Manager

IF10542

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10542 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

1. 1. 2024-01-12T07:27:54-0500

Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power

December 2020

Advantage at Sea

The United States is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas.

The Naval Service—forward deployed and capable of both rapid response and sustained operations globally—remains America’s most persistent and versatile instrument of military influence.

Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, leveraging the complementary authorities and capabilities of the U.S. Navy,

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, advances the prosperity, security, and promise of a free and open, rules-based order.

PREFACE

To the American People,

It’s been 75 years since our combined Sea Services achieved victory in World War II. It took the valor and strength of every Sailor, Marine and Coastguardsman to achieve dominance on the waves, undersea, and in the skies, projecting strength overseas while protecting our shores at home. It also took innovation and cooperation within the Naval Service, across the Joint Force, and throughout the industrial base on an unprecedented scale. We won the war then, and have served side by side ever since, protecting the peace to the great benefit of our Nation, our allies, and the world.

As detailed in the following pages, the rules-based international order is once again under assault. We must prepare as a unified Naval Service to ensure that we are equal to the challenge. The men and women who wear our uniforms are ready, determined, and dedicated to serve with honor, courage and commitment. As leaders, it is our responsibility to ensure they are prepared, equipped, and trained to prevail in long-term strategic competition, win any potential fight, and preserve the future peace.

This strategy details the direction our Service Chiefs have designed together. It is a strong signal of support for our personnel, our allies, and our partners—and a cautionary warning for any would-be adversaries. We are and will always be one force—Semper Fortis, Semper Fidelis, Semper Paratus—always strong, always faithful, and always ready to protect and defend the United States of America, around the clock and around the world.

Very Respectfully,

Kenneth J. Braithwaite Secretary of the Navy

FOREWORD Our actions in this decade will shape the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.

The security environment has dramatically changed since we last published A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in 2015. Several nations are contesting the balance of power in key regions and seeking to undermine the existing world order. Significant technological developments and aggressive military modernization by our rivals are eroding our military advantages. The proliferation of long-range precision missiles means the United States can no longer presume unfettered access to the world’s oceans in times of conflict.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, our three Sea Services have watched with alarm the growing naval power of the People’s Republic of China and the increasingly aggressive behavior of the Russian Federation. Our globally deployed naval forces interact with Chinese and Russian warships and aircraft daily. We witness firsthand their increasing sophistication and growing aggressiveness. Optimism that China and Russia might become responsible leaders contributing to global security has given way to recognition that they are determined rivals. The People’s Republic of China represents the most pressing, long-term strategic threat.

In the midst of fighting two wars, our three Services have worked to meet these global challenges. The Navy has prioritized controlling the seas, increased its forward deployed forces in Asia and Europe, and realigned its warfighting organizations. Today, roughly 60 percent of Navy forces are in the Indo- Pacific region. Sweeping transformation of the Marine Corps is generating greater expeditionary combat power with enhanced capabilities for sea control and sea denial. The Coast Guard is expanding its global engagements and capacity-building efforts in key vulnerable regions. Together, we are developing new operational concepts and redesigning our forces to provide the capability and capacity to execute them. However, we are not yet where we need to be. Getting there will require predictable budgets and on-time funding.

America’s Naval Service defends our Nation by preserving freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and winning wars. For generations, we have underwritten security and prosperity and preserved the values our Nation holds dear. However, China’s behavior and accelerated military growth place it on a trajectory that will challenge our ability to continue to do so. We are at an inflection point. Our integrated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard must maintain clear-eyed resolve to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries while we accelerate development of a modernized, integrated all-domain naval force for the future. Our actions in this decade will shape the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.

Together, we must act with urgency to integrate and modernize our forces as we prepare for the challenges ahead. The boldness of our actions must match the magnitude of our moment. The security of our Nation depends on our ability to maintain advantage at sea.

David H. Berger General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Michael M. Gilday Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Karl L. Schultz Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard

Commandant of the Coast Guard

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. The Security Environment

A Global Competition for Influence

Problem Statement

Implications for the Naval Service

II. Integrated All-Domain Naval Power

III. Employing Naval Forces

Prevailing in Long-Term Strategic Competition

Operating Across the Competition Continuum

In Day-to-Day Competition

In Crisis

In Conflict

IV. Developing Naval Forces

Delivering Integrated All-Domain Naval Forces

Integrating the Naval Service

Conclusion

Annex: Naval Service Investments

Glossary

1

3

3

5

6

7

9

9

10

10

12

13

15

15

17

21

22

25

1Advantage at Sea

INTRODUCTION

The United States is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas. Since the end of World War II, the United States has built, led, and advanced a rules-

based international system through shared commitments with our allies and partners. Forward deployed forces of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—collectively known as the Naval Service—have guaranteed the security of this system. Free and open access to the world’s oceans has fostered an extraordinary era of wealth and peace for many nations. That system is now at risk.

Advantage at Sea is a Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this era of global peace and prosperity. We prioritize competition with China due to its growing economic and military strength, increasing aggressiveness, and demonstrated intent to dominate its regional waters and remake the international order in its favor. Until China chooses to act as a responsible stakeholder rather than brandish its power to further its authoritarian interests, it represents the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system.

Other rivals, including Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, and transnational criminal organizations, also continue to subvert the international rules-based order. We will address these challengers in a coordinated, multinational manner with forces developed to address more significant military threats.

The stakes of this competition are high. China’s aggressive actions are undermining the international rules-based order, while its growing military capacity and capabilities are eroding U.S. military advantages at an alarming rate. The Naval Service must act with urgency, clarity, and vision to take the bold steps required to reverse these trends.

Advantage at Sea provides guidance to the Naval Service for the next decade to prevail across a continuum of competition—composed of interactions with other nations from cooperation to conflict. This strategy emphasizes the following five themes. We must fully

Ten nations, 22 ships, one submarine, and more than 5,300 personnel participate in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020. The biennial exercise is a unique training platform designed to enhance multinational interoperability and strategic maritime partnerships. (USN photo by MC2 Dan Bard)

2 Advantage at Sea

leverage the complementary authorities and capabilities of the Naval Service to generate Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. We must strengthen our alliances and partnerships— our key strategic advantage in this long-term strategic competition—and achieve unity of effort. We must operate more assertively to prevail in day-to-day competition as we uphold the rules-based order and deter our competitors from pursuing armed aggression. If our rivals escalate into conflict, becoming our adversaries, we must control the seas to deny their objectives, defeat their forces, protect our homeland, and defend our allies. And, we must boldly modernize the future naval force to maintain credible deterrence and preserve our advantage at sea.

This strategy connects the Service Chiefs’ statutory roles—developing naval forces and providing best military advice for employing naval forces. Section I outlines the security environment and the problems that we face. Section II articulates how Integrated All-Domain Naval Power addresses these problems. Section III describes how naval power can be applied across the competition continuum in day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict to achieve national objectives. Section IV guides the development and integration of a modernized, all- domain naval force that will ensure our unfettered access to the seas and reverse our eroding military advantages.

The challenges we face require us to make hard choices. This strategy prioritizes our most pressing threats, emphasizes expanded cooperation with allies and partners, and relies on deeper Naval Service integration to mitigate strategic risk to the Nation. Additional detail regarding our priorities, capabilities, investments, divestments, and operational approaches is contained in supporting classified guidance, both existing and forthcoming. Advantage at Sea is complemented by separate Service Chief guidance, such as the Chief of Naval Operations’ Navigation Plan, the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Planning Guidance, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard’s Strategic Plan.

3Advantage at Sea

I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The world’s oceans play a vital role in America’s national security and prosperity. The sea has always been a competitive space that has served as both a strategic buffer and a vital

connection to the world. As strategic competition continues to intensify, our rivals seek to exploit the openness of the maritime domain as they carry out campaigns of coercion and intimidation.

The oceans connect global markets, provide essential resources, and link societies together. By value, 90 percent of global trade travels by sea, facilitating $5.4 trillion of U.S. annual commerce and supporting 31 million American jobs. Undersea cables transmit 95 percent of international communications and roughly $10 trillion in financial transactions each day. For decades, the free and open international order has produced shared security and prosperity throughout the world.

A GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) employ

all instruments of their national power to undermine and remake the international system to serve their own interests. Each conduct a variety of malign activities incrementally, attempting to achieve their objectives without triggering a military response. Both nations back their revisionist activities with regionally powerful militaries and obscure their aggressive behavior by mixing military and paramilitary forces with proxies. China’s and Russia’s attempts to exert control over natural marine resources and restrict access to the oceans have negative repercussions for all nations.

China has implemented a strategy and revisionist approach that aims at the heart of the United States’ maritime power. It seeks to corrode international maritime governance, deny access to traditional logistical hubs, inhibit freedom of the seas, control use of key chokepoints, deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United States as the preferred partner in countries around the world.

To enable its strategy, China deploys a multilayered fleet that includes the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia—naval auxiliaries disguised as civilian vessels—to subvert other nations’ sovereignty and enforce unlawful claims. It continues to militarize disputed features in the South China Sea and assert maritime claims inconsistent with international law. Its state-subsidized distant- water fishing fleet steals vital resources from nations unable to defend their own exclusive economic zones. To support its multilayered fleet, China is also developing the world’s largest missile force, with nuclear capabilities, which is designed to strike U.S. and allied forces in Guam and in the Far East with everything from ballistic missiles to maneuverable cruise and hypersonic missiles. Further, China has centralized its robust strategic, space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities.

With naval forces as the cornerstone of its efforts, China is aggressively growing and modernizing its military. Already commanding the world’s largest naval force, the PRC is building modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, amphibious assault ships, ballistic nuclear missile submarines, large coast guard cutters, and polar

Figure 1: Growth of China’s maritime forces since 2000. (Source: Office of Naval Intelligence)

4 Advantage at Sea

icebreakers at alarming speed. China’s navy battle force has more than tripled in size in only two decades (Figure 1).

This rapid growth is enabled by a robust shipbuilding infrastructure, including multiple shipyards that exceed those in the United States in both size and throughput. In conflict, excess PRC industrial capacity, including additional commercial shipyards, could quickly be turned toward military production and repair, further increasing China’s ability to generate new military forces.

Whereas U.S. naval forces are globally dispersed, supporting U.S. interests and deterring aggression from multiple threats, China’s numerically larger forces are primarily concentrated in the Western Pacific. However, as China seeks to establish regional hegemony, it is also expanding its global reach. China’s One Belt One Road initiative is extending its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure that will enable its forces to operate farther from its shores than ever before, including the polar regions, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic Ocean. These projects often leverage predatory lending terms that China exploits to control access to key strategic maritime locations.

Modernization efforts are also underway in Russia. Its military prioritizes nuclear and advanced missile systems, attack and guided-missile submarines, bombers, missile frigates, fighter jets, air-to-air missiles, and state-of-the-art air defenses. In conflict, Russia may threaten cyber or kinetic strikes against Washington or European capitals, or attack undersea communications cables, causing severe impact to the global economy. It may also gamble that use of nuclear weapons might avert defeat in combat or preclude retaliation.

5Advantage at Sea

Russia’s operations are designed to fragment the international order. Its pursuit of an expanded sphere of influence has been defined by opportunism and a willingness to violate international agreements and laws, as well as use of military force. Its campaign to restore strategic depth has motivated RF aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as its intervention in Syria.

In the event of conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its allies can mount an effective response—leading to a fait accompli. Each supports this approach through investments in counter-intervention networks. Each seeks to shift the burden of escalation by reinforcing annexed territory with long-range precision-strike weapons and make a military response to an invasion seem disproportionately costly.

Additional competitors, violent extremists, and criminal organizations all exploit weak governance at sea, corruption ashore, and gaps in maritime domain awareness. Piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit acts leave governments vulnerable to coercion. Climate change threatens coastal nations with rising sea levels, depleted fish stocks, and more severe weather. Competition over offshore resources, including protein, energy, and minerals, is leading to tension and conf